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Abstract 
The Taylor rule has been used in many studies in order to 
analyse the monetary policies. In my work I focus on the Euro 
era and compare the ECB with other two central banks, the Fed 
and the BoE. A very interesting result comes out from the 
analysis: it seems that these central banks do not observe the 
inflation course before deciding about the variation of the interest 
rates. This result can be linked to two ideas: firstly, the use of 
stationary time series drops out the significance of the inflation 
gap as regressor; secondly, a really forward looking central bank 
focuses on other macroeconomic leading indicators instead of 
examining the realized or expected inflation gap.  
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1 Introduction 
 Since 1993, when Taylor published his work “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”, 
there has been a large debate about the possibility that a simple rule, the so called Taylor Rule, 
might mimic the monetary policy of a Central Bank or another type of monetary policy-maker 
which used the interest rate as the key monetary policy tool. 
The great simplicity of this formula and its good fit to the Federal Reserve monetary policy 
(Taylor applied his rule with very good results to FED monetary policy from 1987 to 1992) gave a 
big impulse to various strands of research focused on the implementation of this rule. 
It is possible to identify three macro types of Modified Taylor Rules. 
First, economists have tried to add a large number of explanatory variables (there were only two 
explanatory variables in the original Taylor Rule: inflation gap and output gap) in order to 
understand which macroeconomic variables Central Banks analyse before taking monetary policy 
decisions and what the economic weight of these variables is. 
The other two strands have tried to change the basic structure of the Taylor Rule. In fact, Taylor 
used contemporaneous variables in the origin. His nominal interest rate, output gap and inflation 
gap all referred to the same time. So, many studies have tried to understand if this kind of 
formulation was really plausible. Thus, two types of Taylor Rules were created: the backward 
looking Taylor Rule, using real time data, and the forward looking Taylor Rule, incorporating 
expectations. 
In the first case the independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent ones:  
information about macroeconomic aggregates are not immediately available and so it seemed to 
be correct linking the interest rate with lagged explanatory variables. 
In the other case economists introduced expectations on the right hand side of the Taylor Rule: 
Central Banks move the interest rate if future trends of the variables, that is, expectations, have a 
different value compared with their targets. 
Given the simplicity and the validity of the formula, since 1993 many papers and articles have 
studied these questions - see Carare and Tchaidze (2005) for a short excursus about different types 
of Taylor Rule -, but the debate on the optimal type of Taylor Rule is still open. Its 
implementations are likely to get good results with both a backward looking rule and a forward 
looking one even when the study is focused on the same period and on the same policy-maker. 
The recent literature seems to give a preference to using the forward looking Taylor Rule, but I 
think that it is always the economist that should always explain his choices and find valid 
economic pillars to his results. 
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Moreover, it is very difficult to cite the literature related to the Taylor Rule, because of its 
bulkiness. There are many important works on this issue and, obviously, it is impossible to refer to 
all of them.  
As a consequence, I decided to cite only the papers and the articles that I used as guidance in my 
own work without any claim of being exhaustive. Obviously, the work by Taylor (1993) is the 
seminal paper for all the contributions in this field. In that study, Taylor proposed for the first time 
the rule and tested its effectiveness with respect to the US Federal Reserve from 1987 to 1992. 
The particular feature of that article is that Taylor did not estimate the rule using econometric 
procedures. Starting from that study, many others have tried implementing that rule and 
estimating the relationship between the interest rate and some regressors. 
Clarida and Gertler (1996) employed a modified Taylor Rule to study the monetary policy of the 
Bundesbank. In this study they used instrumental variables and examined the period from 1974 to 
1993. They found that a modified Taylor rule could be useful in order to explain the behaviour of 
the monetary policy in Germany. Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998) tested the Taylor Rule, using 
the GMM estimation in this case, for the US, Japan, Germany, Italy, France and the UK from 
1979 to 1993. This study is fundamental for the use of GMM estimations with the Taylor Rule. 
Indeed, many following papers use the same structure given by these three economists with 
respect to the instrumental variables used in the regression. 
Judd and Rudebusch (1998) tried to compare the monetary policy of three Fed Chairmen (Burns, 
Volcker and Greenspan) using a modified Taylor Rule. They found that the original Taylor Rule 
fits the Greenspan period very well, but they also stressed that the monetary policy of Burns was 
easier than the one of Greenspan and that Volcker’s monetary policy was the tightest among the 
three chairmen. 
Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) used GMM for the estimation of a Taylor Rule applied to the EMU 
area in the period 1990-1998 and stressed the role of inflation expectations. They also analysed 
other regressors, such as the Euro-Us Dollar exchange rate, the money growth and the lagged 
inflation, but these regressors turned out insignificant in their study. 
Florens, Jondeau and Le Bihan (2001), using GMM and ML estimations, estimated a reaction 
function for the Federal Reserve. They employed a Taylor rule and found that the coefficients 
show differences in the estimates depending on whether they use the iterative or the continuous-
updating GMM. The coefficients they computed with GMM estimations were indeed very large in 
comparison with the usual values computed in other studies. 
Ball and Tchaidze (2002) used the Taylor Rule to analyse and compare two periods of the 
Greenspan’s tenure (the old economy period 1987-1995 vs the new economy one 1995-2000). 
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They tested the importance of the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) as a 
regressor in the Taylor rule and highlighted that, using this type of regression, the rule can mimic 
in a good way the behaviour of Greenspan during the entire period of his presidency. 
Fourçans and Vranceanu (2002) estimated different policy rules for the ECB from 1999 to 2002, 
using OLS and GMM. They showed that the ECB is a conservative central bank, that is the 
increase in the interest rate is not so big when inflation grows, and that the ECB is also focused on 
the real economy. Furthermore, they also found that the monetary aggregate M3 did not influence 
the conduct of monetary policy. 
Ullrich (2003), using 2SLS, made a comparison between the Fed and the ECB  from 1995 to 
2002. This study used first differences to make the time series stationary. This approach is similar 
to the one I adopt in my study and it is important to stress that some studies on the Taylor Rule did 
not consider the problem of the possible presence of unit roots in the time series (on this issue see 
Österholm, 2005). So, in order to have a robust estimation, I prefer to follow this approach and 
use time series in first difference in my study, as I will explain in the following pages. 
Sauer and Sturm (2003) used Taylor Rule to study the ECB during the first years of the Euro era. 
They employed OLS and NLS and found that, with the use of expectations, the coefficient on 
inflation seems to comply with the Taylor principle. On the contrary, using contemporaneous 
data, it emerged an ECB that accommodates the changes in the inflation rate. They also stressed 
the poor role of the real-time industrial production data, differently from the US case. 
Surico (2003) analysed the ECB monetary policy from July 1997 to October 2002. In his work he 
also compared the ECB with the Bundesbank and the Fed. His equation has been estimated via 
OLS and GMM and it contained the usual coefficients on inflation and output together with 
coefficients on squared inflation and squared output. Surico used variables in level and it 
emerged, among the various results, that the ECB gave the same attention to inflationary and 
deflationary risks. As regards the output stabilization, Surico found that the behaviour of the ECB 
is very similar to the one adopted by the Bundesbank in a earlier period. 
Clausen and Meier (2005) used the Taylor Rule (GMM estimation) in the period 1973-1998 in 
order to evaluate the Bundesbank monetary policy. They used different types of output gap and 
found that the Taylor rule mimicked “quite well” the Bundesbank monetary policy. They also 
found a very limited role for the monetary aggregate M3. In the end, also in this case, the Taylor 
rule proved a good formula to replicate the monetary policy of a central bank. 
Apergis, Miller, Panethimitakis and Vamvakidis (2005) studied a model in which they inserted a 
Taylor-type rule. They examined forward looking and spontaneous adjustment rules, with an 
international view, and found that the forward looking approach gave a better contribution to 
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macroeconomic stability. Moreover, they found that a positive inflation target gave a better result 
than the zero inflation target. 
Carstensen (2006), using a probit model, estimated the coefficients of a rule similar to the one 
proposed by Taylor. He focused on the ECB from January 1999 to January 2003. In the end, he 
stressed that the revision of the monetary policy strategy, undertaken in 2002, did not affect the 
coefficients of the rule. 
Rotondi and Vaciago (2007) used a Taylor-type rule and GMM estimation in order to compare the 
ECB and the Bundesbank monetary policies. Even in this case the coefficient on the inflation gap 
using the backward looking Taylor rule is lower than the one obtained with the forward looking 
version of the rule. 
Gorter, Jacobs and de Haan (2007) tested different types of Taylor rules and focused on the 
comparison between Consensus data and ex-post data for the Euro area. They also tried to deeply 
analyse the role and the significance of the interest rate smoothing. They found an important 
difference in the coefficients on ex-post data in comparison with the ones on the Consensus data: 
the ECB’s policy is stabilizing only using the survey data (that is, the Consensus data). In this 
study they employed NLS. 
Another interesting and recent paper (Parsley and Popper, 2009), using standard and data-rich 
GMM, estimated three equations for the Korean economy from January 1999 to April 2008. One 
of these equations is a policy reaction function that resembles a Taylor rule. They use the 
exchange rate in the formula and often find a significant relationship between this regressor and 
the interest rate. Usually the exchange rate is not used in a monetary policy rule, but some of the 
works I cited use it and, recently, even Engle (2009) demonstrates the usefulness of introducing 
the exchange rate in an open-economy two-country model. Indeed, Engel affirms that the 
exchange rate misalignments create a loss of welfare and, so, an optimal policy has to target 
currency misalignments together with the inflation and output gaps. 
Starting from this literature, I present an analysis based on a comparison among three areas: the 
Euro Area, the US and the UK. I use a threefold econometric approach (OLS, TSLS, GMM) in 
order to examine, through a Taylor-type rule, the monetary policy of the ECB, the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England. Furthermore, with this work, I follow both the backward and 
the forward looking Taylor Rule strands and try to find some empirical evidence on the ECB’s 
behaviour from the onset of its operations, January 1999, to June 2008. The study, as I will duly 
explain in the following pages, uses standard OLS, TSLS and iterative GMM estimations. I 
adopted the OLS estimation with the backward looking formula while the TSLS and the iterative 
GMM were employed with the forward looking version of the Taylor rule. 
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It is worth noting that the rule I present in the next sections is not very similar to the one widely 
adopted in the literature, since problems of stationarity induced me to use the first differences of 
the time series. As a consequence, it is not possible to directly compare the results of this study 
with the ones of the dominant literature. But, in so doing, I have avoided all the possible problems 
linked to a spurious regression. I preferred to follow this methodology instead of having problems 
with the quality of my analysis. 
Before introducing the equations I studied and the results obtained with the different estimations, I 
show, in the following paragraph, the course of the real interest rate in these three areas as a 
simple and immediate indicator of the stance of monetary policy. Indeed, the real interest rate can 
show the strength with which central banks fought against inflation pressures. This simple vision 
will be useful to introduce the econometric section of this paper.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the second paragraph I depict the course of the 
real interest rate in the UK, the US and the Euro area from January 1999 to June 2008. Then I 
expand the analysis and show the real interest rate in the US, the UK, Germany, France and Italy 
from January 1984 to December 1998; in the third paragraph I present the backward and forward 
looking equations and the data; in the fourth section I show the results of the regressions with 
OLS, TSLS and iterative GMM estimations; the fifth paragraph is focused on the ECB’s 
behaviour and I try to stress the particular features of the monetary policy in the Euro area; the last 
section concludes the paper with final remarks. 
 
2 The trends of the interest rates 
In order to examine the role of monetary policy in dampening and controlling the trend of 
the inflation rate, an examination of the movements of the real interest rate is of primary 
importance. This simple indicator can reveal the behaviour of the central banks and their approach 
towards inflation pressures. For this reason, in this paragraph I present a simple visual analysis of 
the movements of the real interest rate in three areas: the Euro area, the US and the UK. More 
precisely, I calculated the real interest rate in these three areas from January 1999 to June 2008 in 
order to compare these three central banks during the first ten years of the Euro.  
Moreover, I move another step further by calculating the real interest rate from January 1984 to 
December 1998 in the US, the UK, Germany, France and Italy. In this way one can build a 
twofold analysis: a comparison among the ECB, the Fed and the Bank of England during the last 
decade and a comparison among the ECB and the pre-existing national central banks. 
Obviously, the movements of the real interest rate are linked with the global situation that a 
central bank has to face and so this fact can reduce the importance of the intertemporal 
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comparison. But I think that this approach, although simple and probably limited, can help us 
draw some important preliminary judgements on this issue. Indeed, the period examined is that of 
the “Great Moderation”. During this period the central banks faced a quite good climate in terms 
of both (moderate) price dynamics and (high) growth. This can help us in the comparison. Except 
for national and temporary shocks (for example in Italy and in the UK in first years of the nineties, 
or in the US in 2001), the twenty-four years of the sample represent an exceptionally good period 
for the central banks. As a consequence it is possible to compare their behaviours over time. 
Figure 1 shows the first part of the analysis. We can observe the trend of the real interest rate in 
the Euro area, the US and the UK. The real interest rate is given by the difference between the 
monthly average of the overnight rate and the monthly inflation rates. I used data taken from the 
OECD and Eurostat websites. 
It is widely known that these central banks have a different approach. For example, the ECB has 
an explicit inflation target while the Federal Reserve has an implicit target. Furthermore, they 
have different inflation rates as targets of their monetary policy. As a consequence, in order to 
build a precise graph, I used the HICP (all items) for the Euro area, the core inflation (CPI, all 
items less energy and food) for the US and the CPI (all items) for the UK. These are the inflation 
rates that those three central banks use as their targets. The lines depicted in the figure show the 
difference between these inflation rates and the respective overnight interest rates. 
Globally speaking, the graph suggests that during the last years these Central banks did not adopt 
a so tight monetary policy. The Bank of England had the highest real interest rate during almost 
the entire period. In this case, the real interest rate lies within a narrow range, from 2 to 5 per cent, 
in almost all the sample. On the contrary, the Fed moved the real interest rate in an ampler way, 
from 4 to -1 per cent. It is important to notice that the Fed adopted a very expansive monetary 
policy from the end of 2001 to the end of 2004, with a negative real interest rate during this 
period. 
The ECB has had a mixed strategy: it has moved the real interest rate in a range similar to the one 
of the BoE, but it always had a lower rate than the BoE, more similar to the one of the Fed. We 
can even observe a period of negative real interest rate from the first half of 2004 to the end of 
2006. For the ECB, the range goes from -0.5 to 3 per cent. It is of great importance noticing that 
during two periods (from February 1999 to January 2001 and from February 2005 to January 
2008) the ECB had the lowest real interest rate.  
This international comparison suggests that the ECB did not implement a very tight monetary 
policy during the last decade. So, the first finding is that the direct role of the monetary policy in 
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dampening and controlling the inflation rate, through the use of the interest rate as the main tool, 
is probably softer than we could typically expect. 
 
Figure: 1 Real interest rate in the Euro area, the US and the UK.  
January 1999 - June 2008 
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Source: Personal calculations using Eurostat, Bank of England and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data 
 
Over the longer period, from January 1984 to June 2008, Figure 2 shows the real interest rate 
(overnight rate minus CPI in all the cases) for the US, the UK, the Euro area, Germany, Italy and 
France. Obviously, the Figure shows the real interest rate of the Euro area from January 1999 
ahead and the real interest rate of Germany, France and Italy from January 1984 to December 
1998. Even in this case I use monthly data. 
The figure suggests that the BoE usually has a tighter monetary policy in comparison with the 
other nations. The central banks of Italy and France adopted a tighter monetary policy than the 
UK but only for a limited period. 
With the onset of the Euro, the monetary policy of this area probably changed. Indeed, it seems 
that the national central banks adopted a tighter monetary policy during their life in comparison 
with the one chosen by the ECB during these first years of its activity. Clearly, the ECB faces a 
different economic environment and different economic pressures but it seems that during the 
Euro era monetary policy has been easier than in the previous years. 
Indeed, the crucial feature of this analysis is that monetary policy during the Euro era has not been 
particularly tight both historically and internationally. This is only a simple descriptive analysis 
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but it suggests anyhow that the trend of the real interest rate cannot easily explain the low inflation 
rate the Euro area experienced. As a consequence, this preliminary study indicates we should 
deepen the analysis on monetary policy in search of some other more robust explanations. 
This is what I will present in the following pages: an econometric study on the monetary policy 
using a Taylor-type rule. 
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3 Equations and data 
In this section I present the equations I estimate and the data I use for the regressions. It is 
worth noting that a large part of the literature often assumes the stationarity of the time series used 
in the Taylor Rule. Furthermore, many papers do not treat this argument at all - see Österholm 
(2005) for a criticism of these issues. In my work I analyse this issue in depth before starting with 
the econometrics in order to exclude the possibility of spurious regressions. The results of the 
ADF, Phillips-Perron and KPSS tests on the time series leave no doubt. Unit roots are present in 
some of the time series I should use in my analysis following the traditional form of the Taylor 
rule. For example, the monthly average of the overnight interest rate time series features a unit 
root in the three areas that I analyse (the Euro area, the US and the UK). The same problem 
surfaces in other time series (for example in the inflation gaps, or in the exchange rates). As a 
consequence, in order to estimate the same equation for the three areas and avoid errors in the 
estimations I decided to use the first difference form for all the equations and for all the time 
series. In this way I eliminated the possibility of spurious regressions, even if the value of the 
coefficients is completely different from the one obtained with the original Taylor rule. This is a 
problem if one wants to compare the analysis of these pages with other works, but in this way we 
are sure that the significance of the relationships is not linked to the presence of the unit roots.  
After this procedure, all the time series I employ in this study are stationary (see table 10 for the 
results of the tests). The results clearly highlight the absence of a unit root. 
But this procedure has changed the structure of the Taylor rule. The formula proposed by Taylor 
in 1993 is similar to the following one: 
 
tt
gap
t
gap
tt zxi εββββ +++Π+= 4321  
 
where the dependent variable, the interest rate, ti , is regressed on a constant, an inflation gap 
gap
tΠ , an output gap 
gap
tx  and other regressors tz . The formula of my study is different because, 
as I said, I employ time series in first difference.  
The first equation I estimate, the baseline version, is the following one:  
 
ttt
gap
t
gap
tt iexi εβββββ +∆+∆++∆Π+=∆ −−−− 151413121 , (1) 
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where ti  is the day to day interest rate, 
gap
t 1−Π  is the inflation gap in period t-1, 
gap
tx 1−  is the output 
gap in period t-1, 1−te  is the log of the exchange rate index in period t-1 and∆ denotes series in 
first difference. 
This equation is backward looking, since we have lagged independent variables in the right hand 
side of the equation. I estimated this equation through OLS and it represents the first step of my 
analysis. The two fundamental differences, in comparison with the original rule, are the use of the 
first differences and the lags on the right side of the formula. 
This type of formula and the OLS estimation represent the basic way to estimate a Taylor rule. 
This approach is very elementary even if it is used in literature, especially in the more dated 
papers. 
In order to expand and deepen the analysis I estimated another formula. The crucial role that the 
expectations have in the literature induced me to also use a more complex approach. Indeed, I 
estimated a forward looking rule in order to compare the results of the two methodologies. In this 
case I use both the TSLS and the iterative GMM estimations. The TSLS is used in some studies 
and it gives the same results of the standard GMM approach under normal conditions. The 
iterative GMM is not so widespread in the literature but I decided to use it in order to have a 
further comparison and evaluate the different results (Florens, Jondeau and Le Bihan (2001) used 
the two-step GMM and the iterative GMM in order to compare the different results and highlight 
their properties).  
The following formula visualizes the second equation I estimated: 
 
tttkttt
gap
kttt
gap
kttt iexi εβββββ +∆+Ω∆Ε+ΩΕ+Ω∆ΠΕ+=∆ −+++ 154321 )|()|()|(  (2) 
 
In this case )|( t
gap
ktt Ω∆ΠΕ +  represents the expectation at time t of the inflation gap t+k periods 
ahead, )|( t
gap
ktt x Ω∆Ε +  is the expectation of the output gap and )|( tktt e Ω∆Ε +  is the expectation of 
the exchange rate. tΩ  represents the set of the available information at time t. The other symbols 
have the same meaning of the previous formula. In this case, it is straightforward to observe that 
the formula is completely forward looking. I substitute the lagged independent variables of the 
equation 1 with their respective expectations. 
The instruments used for the estimations are the same both for the TSLS and for the iterative 
GMM. I followed the mainstream literature, even though, I introduced some changes. I employed 
a constant and the lagged independent variables together with other variables as instruments. To 
be more precise, I used as instruments a constant, lags 1 to 6, lag 9 and lag 12 of the exchange rate 
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and interest rate, lags 2 to 7, lag 9 and lag 12 of the inflation gap, output gap and commodity 
prices. The use of different lags in comparison with a large part of the literature (see Clarida, Galì 
and Gertler, 1998) for the inflation gap, the output gap and the commodity prices, is motivated by 
the fact that these variables are not immediately calculated and so I decided not to use the lag 1 
within the set of available information at time t. In other words, I use a slightly different set of 
instrumental variables in order to make the estimations more realistic. For these three variables I 
employ lags 2 to 7 instead of lags 1 to 6. It is a very slight change, but I decided to employ it 
because in this way one can mimic more precisely the way in which the policy makers form their 
expectations. Moreover, I followed the critique by Orphanides (1997) which underlined the 
problems related to the use of contemporaneous independent and dependent variables in the 
original Taylor rule. In his study he focused on the US case during the period 1987-1992 (the 
same period analysed by Taylor, 1993) and showed the differences that emerged using 
contemporaneous or real time data. In so doing, he stressed the limits of the original formulation 
of the Taylor rule and recommended to be more cautious in the choice of the right timing for the 
variables. As a consequence, following his teaching I try to use this different set of instruments to 
make the estimations more reliable.   
Before showing the results of the three types of estimations, it is useful to analyse in depth the 
data I used for my study. 
As regards the inflation gap, I used the annual rate of change of the HICP published by Eurostat 
for the Euro area, the core inflation for the US (CPI, all items less food and energy published by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics) and the CPI (all items, published by the UK government) for the 
UK. In all the cases the gap is referred to a 2 per cent threshold. In the case of the US, this ceiling 
is not explicit but there is a common view about the importance of this threshold for the core 
inflation. Then, given the lack of stationarity, I calculated the monthly variation of the inflation 
gap and employed this series in the regressions. 
For the output gap, I employed the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter on the industrial production index 
time series (data from OECD for the three areas) and then I calculated the difference between the 
actual data and the trend obtained through the HP filter: 
 
 gaptx  = 100*[log(IPt) - log(IP*)]  
 
where IPt is the actual series of the industrial production and IP* is the time series calculated 
through the HP filter. The output gap series calculated in this way are stationary.  
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As regards the exchange rate, I employed different exchange rates to have an ampler inspection. I 
used the “broad” and the “narrow” nominal effective exchange rates, published by the Bank for 
International Settlements, and one bilateral exchange rate for each nations: the Euro-US dollar for 
the Euro area, the Pound Sterling-US Dollar for the UK and the US Dollar-Euro for the US. All 
these time series are published by Eurostat. In this case I used the monthly percentage variation of 
the exchange rates in my estimations. 
The interest rate, as I said before, is the monthly average of the overnight interest rate (data 
published by Eurostat for the three areas) and in the estimations I used the monthly variation. 
For the commodity price, used as an instrument, I used an index, in dollars, published by the 
International Monetary Fund. In this case I used the US dollar-Euro and the US dollar-Pound 
Sterling exchange rates to transform the time series of the commodity prices for the Euro area and 
the UK cases. In all the cases I employed the first difference of the log of the series. 
 
4 Results 
The analysis I have done tries to compare, as I have pre-announced, three economic areas: 
the Euro area, the US and the UK. In so doing, it is possible to highlight the particular features of 
the Euro area. 
In the following pages I will firstly show the backward looking estimations and then I will employ 
the forward looking version of the rule.  
 
Backward looking – OLS 
The following tables show the estimation of the equation 1. In this case I employ the OLS 
estimation.  
Tables 1, 2 and 3 respectively show the results using, as regressors, the broad NEER, the narrow 
NEER and the bilateral exchange rates previously mentioned. In the tables I show the value of the 
coefficients, their significance, the R2 statistics, the Durbin Watson test, the results of the White 
test and the maximum value of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF).  
The first important things to analyse are the coefficients on the inflation gap. These coefficients 
are not statistically different from zero in the three areas and with the three different exchange 
rates used. It seems that the relationship between the interest rate and the inflation gap is no longer 
present using this specification of the formula. 
As regards the coefficient on the output gap, β3, we can observe a significant coefficient, at one 
percent level, for the Euro area, but insignificant coefficients in the other two nations. We got the 
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same result using the different exchange rates. In this case the ECB seems to be more alert on the 
information coming out from the real economy in comparison with the other central banks. 
Moreover, a more mixed result comes out with the coefficient on the exchange rate: in the Euro 
area this coefficient is always statistically different from zero and it has the right sign. It is bigger 
in the first two cases (broad and narrow NEER) than in the case of the Euro-US Dollar exchange 
rate; in the US this coefficient has always the wrong sign and only the bilateral exchange rate is 
significant; for the UK, the exchange rate is always highly significant but with the wrong sign. 
Even in this case, the ECB seems to observe the fluctuations of the exchange rate as an indicator 
for the pace of the monetary policy. 
At the end, the lagged dependent variable is highly significant in the US and the UK in all the 
three cases, but it is not significant in the Euro area.  
The values of the statistics shown in the tables highlight that there are no problems of 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity or collinearity. Indeed, the Durbin Watson tests show values 
around 2, the White tests show the absence of heteroskedasticity and the VIFs have a very little 
value. 
These results show a different approach of the three central banks: the ECB seems to be more alert 
on information about the economy (output gap) and exchange rates, while in the other cases (the 
Fed and the BoE) these coefficients are not significant or they have the wrong sign. But the most 
interesting result is the one linked with the inflation gap coefficients. With this specification of the 
Taylor rule it seems that the central banks do not observe the fluctuation of the inflation gap 
before deciding about the variations of the interest rate. Obviously, in these cases all the time 
series are stationary and so the lack of this linkage is really interesting for a real insight of the 
central banks behaviour. 
This first step has highlighted different results in comparison with the literature. The inflation gap 
is not significant and this is really strange for central banks that have an explicit or implicit 
inflation target. The Fed has no significant policy coefficients (except for one case, but with the 
wrong sign). Only the smoothing parameter is significant in the three estimations. The situation 
for the BoE is not so different from the US case. 
These results are surprising but one has to be cautious: this is the backward looking approach and 
before drawing a definitive conclusion it is wise to also observe the forward looking results.  
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Table 1: OLS, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: broad NEER 
 EA US UK 
1β  
0.006 -0.002 -0.014 
2β  
-0.064 -0.077 -0.081 
3β  
2.648*** -1.349 2.548 
4β  
-2.170** 1.443 4.565*** 
5β  
0.167 0.720*** -0.466*** 
adj R2 0.120 0.498 0.210 
DW 2.12 2.29 1.99 
Test 
White  
9.96 
pv: 0.764 
16.23 
pv: 0.299 
15.00 
pv: 0.377 
V.I.F. <1.12 <1.04 <1.06 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, ***Significant at 
one percent level. 
 
Table 2: OLS, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: narrow NEER 
 EA US UK 
1β  
0.005 -0.002 -0.012 
2β  
-0.064 -0.080 -0.080 
3β  
2.735*** -1.360 2.502 
4β  
-2.160** 0.766 4.546*** 
5β  
0.165 0.721*** -0.464*** 
adj R2 0.117 0.496 0.211 
DW 2.11 2.30 2.00 
Test 
White  
10.65 
pv: 0.712 
16.43 
pv: 0.287 
14.27 
pv: 0.429 
V.I.F. <1.14 <1.04 <1.05 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, ***Significant at 
one percent level. 
 
Table 3: OLS, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: bilateral rate 
 EA US UK 
1β  
0.006 -0.000 -0.019 
2β  
-0.063 -0.087 -0.092 
3β  
2.567*** -1.272 2.014 
4β  
-1.320** 1.387** 2.757*** 
5β  
0.169 0.713*** -0.463*** 
adj R2 0.119 0.517 0.209 
DW 2.07 2.32 1.97 
Test 
White  
9.33 
p v:0.809 
15.63 
p v:0.335 
15.76 
p v: 0.328 
V.I.F. <1.1 <1.04 <1.04 
*Significant at ten percent level, **Significant at five percent level,  
***Significant at one percent level. 
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Forward looking – TSLS 
As I have previously said, in order to deepen the analysis I also use a forward looking 
version of my rule. I estimate equation 2 through TSLS and iterative GMM. In this section I show 
the TSLS estimation results. Tables 4, 5, 6 illustrate the estimated coefficients, the R2 and the 
Durbin Watson statistics. Even in this case I employ three different exchange rates as regressors 
(broad and narrow NEER and a bilateral exchange rate). 
The results are not so different from those obtained with the OLS-backward looking approach. 
Indeed, the coefficient on the inflation gap is statistically different from zero in only one case (in 
the US with broad NEER). In the other cases we find no significant coefficient. So, even using the 
expectations, the situation does not change. It seems that the central banks I analysed in this study 
do not observe the course of the inflation gap before deciding on the interest rate variations. 
Obviously, this result is quite surprising. 
 
Table 4: TSLS, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: broad NEER 
 EA US UK 
1β  0.005 -0.001 -0.008 
2β  0.021 0.371* 0.045 
3β  
2.152** -1.829 5.274 
4β  -1.814 1.763 1.931 
5β  
0.134** 0.747*** -0.488*** 
adj R2 0.031 0.543 0.227 
DW 2.20 2.13 1.96 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, 
***Significant at one percent level. 
 
 
Table 5: TSLS, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: narrow NEER 
 EA US UK 
1β  0.007 0.000 -0.007 
2β  0.011 0.306 0.044 
3β  
2.270** -1.705 5.073 
4β  -2.469* 1.671 1.605 
5β  
0.126 0.751*** -0.488*** 
adj R2 0.024 0.540 0.225 
DW 2.22 2.15 1.95 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, 
***Significant at one percent level. 
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Table 6: TSLS, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: bilateral rate 
 EA US UK 
1β  0.007 0.001 -0.015 
2β  0.003 0.281 0.092 
3β  
1.914* -1.579 5.279 
4β  -1.391** 1.371* 2.408 
5β  
0.150 0.739*** -0.484*** 
adj R2 0.025 0.526 0.213 
DW 2.25 2.19 1.95 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, 
***Significant at one percent level. 
 
As regard the coefficient on the output gap, the situation is similar to the previous one. The 
coefficient is statistically different from zero and with the right sign in the Euro area, but in the 
other two areas this coefficient is not significant at all. Again, using the expectations, the ECB 
seems to be focused on the course of the real economy, that is the industrial production. 
The situation is mixed when we analyse the exchange rates. In this case, the broad NEER is not 
significant in the three regions, and it has the right sign only in the Euro area. The narrow NEER 
is significant in the Euro area and it has the right sign, but this coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero in the other two nations. The bilateral exchange rate is highly significant in the 
Euro area, again with the right sign, and it is slightly significant in the US, but in this case with the 
wrong sign. 
The Durbin Watson statistics are always near 2.  
In sum, the situation with the forward looking approach and TSLS estimations is not so different 
from the one depicted with the backward looking rule. Indeed, even in this case the ECB seems to 
be the unique central bank that has a focus on the real economy and on the fluctuations of the 
exchange rates (but I am not affirming that ECB controls the exchange rate). The other 
estimations, for the FED and the BoE, do not show significant coefficients. The last thing to 
notice is the lack of significance for the coefficient on the inflation rate, as previously mentioned.  
 
Forward looking – iterative GMM  
The last estimation is carried out through the iterative GMM. In this case it is useful to give some 
details in order to fully explain the set-up I used. 
Firstly, the weighting matrix (W) employed in this case is an identity matrix (I). Given the nature 
of the iterative GMM, the matrix W is recalculated several times until convergence is achieved. 
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So, the use of the identity matrix for the first step of the iteration does not create problems for the 
robustness of the results.  
Moreover, I used the kernel of Bartlett and the software by default calculates HAC 
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) estimations. So, the coefficients do not 
incorporate these possible problems. 
In tables 7, 8 and 9 I show the value of the estimated coefficients together with the J-test. 
The J-test, or test for over-identifying restrictions, has the correct specification of the model as 
null hypothesis. The results of the Hansen’s J-test are always positive: in all the cases it is not 
possible to reject the null. As a consequence the models tested in this section are “valid”. 
The values of the coefficients are, in some cases, very surprising.  
In the Euro area case, the coefficient on the inflation gap is now significant but it has the wrong 
sign in the three cases. This result is deeply different in comparison with the TSLS and OLS 
estimations, in which the coefficient on the inflation gap has never been significant. The output 
gap is significant in the first and third specifications (with the broad NEER and with the Euro-US 
dollar exchange rate) and it has the right sign. The smoothing parameter is now significant for the 
first time in the Euro area case. As regards the exchange rates, the broad and narrow NEER are 
not significant, while the euro-US dollar exchange rate remains significant and with the right sign.  
As regards the US, the exchange rate is significant in two cases (broad NEER and bilateral 
exchange rate) but with the wrong sign. The smoothing parameter and the constant are significant, 
but the other coefficients are not statistically different from zero. In this case the estimation is 
similar to the previous ones. The Taylor rule estimated with US data shows a Federal Reserve that 
does not care about inflation and the real economy. 
For the UK the situation is mixed: the constant and the smoothing parameter are always 
significant; the inflation gap is significant in the last case only and it has the right sign; the other 
coefficients (output gap and exchange rate) give strange results: the output gap is statistically 
different from zero in the three cases, but it has the right sign only in the first regression; the 
exchange rate is significant in the three equations and it has the right sign in the last two 
regressions (narrow NEER and bilateral exchange rate). 
The estimations with the iterative GMM have given mixed results: we find more coefficients with 
significant values but they often have the wrong sign. The situation is not extremely different 
from that depicted in the previous tables. 
The presence of different values is not so strange. In other works, some of these have been 
previously cited, the use of different estimation methodologies produced very different values of 
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the coefficients. But, notwithstanding this fact, it is possible to draw some conclusions on the 
basis of the estimated data. 
 
Table 7: iterative GMM, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: broad NEER 
 EA US UK 
1β  0.012** 0.010*** 0.016* 
2β  -0.152*** -0.029 -0.005 
3β  
1.216*** -0.697 5.950*** 
4β  -0.537 1.229* 3.707** 
5β  
-0.173*** 0.694*** -0.697*** 
J-test 20.02 
pv:0.98 
18.86 
pv:0.99  
20.38 
pv:0.98  
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, 
***Significant at one percent level. 
 
Table 8: iterative GMM, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: narrow NEER 
 EA US UK 
1β  0.003 0.007** 0.018* 
2β  -0.109*** -0.019 0.023 
3β  
0.509 -0.252 -4.203*** 
4β  0.461 0.567 -3.697** 
5β  
-0.170*** 0.568*** -0.636*** 
J-test 19.29 
pv:0.98 
18.35 
pv:0.99 
19.96 
pv:0.98 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, 
***Significant at one percent level. 
 
Table 9: iterative GMM, robust standard error, sample January 1999-June 2008. 
Dependent variable: day to day rate. Exchange rate: bilateral rate 
 EA US UK 
1β  0.015*** 0.007** 0.020** 
2β  -0.120*** -0.020 0.361*** 
3β  
0.916** -0.763 -3.279*** 
4β  -0.547** 0.585** -2.133** 
5β  
-0.119*** 0.573*** -0.474*** 
J-test 20.45 
pv: 0.98 
18.58 
pv:0.99 
21.21 
pv:0.97 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, 
***Significant at one percent level. 
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5 The central banks’ behaviour 
This complex study sheds a critical light on the role of monetary policy. Many works have 
studied the movements of the inflation rate during the last decades and, at the same time, it is well 
known the role of monetary policy as a possible explanation of the Great Moderation (as regards 
the Great Moderation see, for example,  Bernanke, 2004, Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin, 2008, 
Melick and Galati, 2006, or Rogoff, 2003, while for an analysis of the inflation processes see 
Angeloni, Aucremanne and Ciccarelli, 2006, Angeloni, Aucremanne, Ehrmann, Galì, Levin and 
Smets, 2004, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2006, Berck, 2000, Borio and Filardo, 2007, 
Cecchetti and Debelle, 2005, Cogley and Sargent, 2001, or Forte, 2009a). The interesting feature 
is that the result given by the estimations presented in this paper is a little bit surprising, if we 
remember the key role of central banking in the theoretical framework of the Great Moderation. 
In fact, I found that the coefficients on the inflation gap were insignificant in my regressions. This 
means that the decisions on the interest rate course are not linked with the fluctuations of the 
inflation gap. Obviously, this is a very strange picture for central banks that have to anchor the 
inflation rate around the target, especially for the ECB and the BoE that have an explicit target. I 
think that this result reduces the role of the central banks in guiding and anchoring the inflation 
rate during the last decades. Furthermore, this result would suggest that these monetary policies 
might have led to an unstable inflation process. And this is at odds with the mandate of the central 
banks. For the ECB, we have observed a focus on the real economy and on the fluctuations of the 
exchange rates, but this result cannot cover the lack of attention on the inflation process. 
In other words, the study has highlighted a very low direct attention of the three central banks 
towards their main targets and, as a consequence, the conclusion is that it is not possible to ascribe 
to these authorities a crucial role in dampening and guiding the inflation course. 
In sum, it is possible to hold that, using stationary time series, the result obtained via the Taylor 
rule reduces the presumed key role of the central banks as prominent figures in the context of the 
low and stable inflation. As a consequence, that result, the low inflation, is probably linked to 
other global economic features. 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper I have used a modified Taylor rule to examine the monetary policy of the 
European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England during the last years (from 
January 1999 to June 2008). The purpose of this paper was to find a possible linkage between the 
monetary policy and the stable course of the inflation, especially in the Euro area. The 
 22 
international comparison was useful in order to highlight the particular features of the central 
banks I analysed. 
The lack of stationarity in some time series induced me to use the first difference of the data in 
order to avoid the presence of spurious regressions. In so doing, I transformed the original Taylor 
rule and I obtained results that are not directly comparable with the main literature in this field of 
research. I used three different methodologies for the estimation of the rule: OLS for the backward 
looking version and TSLS and iterative GMM for the forward looking specification. I introduced 
slight changes in the formula and in the instruments used as set of information in the forward 
looking set-up. 
The estimations have showed some interesting, and a little bit surprising, results. 
Firstly, the coefficient on the inflation gap has been always insignificant or with the wrong sign. 
This means that the variation of the interest rate is not linked with the variation of the inflation 
gap. This result has been valid both with the backward looking and the forward looking approach. 
This feature is the most surprising one of this work: the three central banks of the study do not 
care about the course of the inflation gap. 
As regards the output gap, the ECB seems to be alert toward this indicator while the other two 
central banks do not show, in many cases, significant coefficients. In this case it is possible to 
assert that the ECB shows a certain degree of attention toward the economic growth as indicator 
of possible threats for the stability of the inflation. 
I obtained a similar result with the exchange rates. In this case the regressions with the Euro area 
data show that the ECB observes the trend of the exchange rates. In details, I used both a broad 
and a narrow version of the NEER (by BIS) and the Euro-Us dollar bilateral exchange rate and I 
found that the coefficients on these exchange rates are often significant both with the backward 
looking and the forward looking formulas. For the other central banks, the role of the exchange 
rate is extremely limited.  
These results cannot shed more light on the stability of the inflation rate in the Euro area, in the 
US or in the UK . We have observed a not so direct approach toward the inflation gap. The ECB, 
even if it shows a more active behaviour in comparison with the Fed and the BoE, does not seem 
to be really aggressive against the inflation course. This finding can lead to two different ideas: 
one is that probably the stability of the inflation is linked with other economic factors. I gave an 
idea on this issue in Forte A. (2009b); the second is that the standard Taylor rule has two 
problems: firstly, the use of time series in level probably produces spurious regressions; secondly, 
my analysis highlighted that the central banks probably examine other macroeconomic-indicators. 
That is, a pure forward looking approach induces the central banks to focus on leading indicators 
 23 
instead of observing the realized or expected inflation. This can open a new strand of research: a 
Taylor rule without the inflation gap as regressor. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 unit root tests. 
Phillips Perron: H0: unit root. KPSS: H0: stationary 
 Phillips Perron KPSS 
∆ dtd US -4.811*** 0.1066 
∆ dtd UK -15.364*** 0.1940 
∆ dtd EA -9.852*** 0.1315 
∆ infl. gap US  -10.720*** 0.0786 
∆ infl. gap UK -10.117*** 0.2855 
∆ infl. gap EA -9.539*** 0.1383 
Output gap US -2.912** 0.1332 
Output gap UK -5.463*** 0.1557 
Output gap EA -3.663*** 0.1960 
∆ Broad NEER US -8.246*** 0.5045** 
∆ Broad NEER UK -10.025*** 0.2519 
∆ Broad NEER EA -7.625*** 0.2292 
∆ Narrow NEER US -8.121*** 0.3045 
∆ Narrow NEER UK -10.032*** 0.2082 
∆ Narrow NEER EA -7.592*** 0.3977* 
∆ Euro/US dollar exch. rate -7.781*** 0.3830* 
∆ Pound St./US dollar exch. rate -9.371*** 0.2193 
∆ Commodity US -9.541*** 0.2396 
∆ Commodity UK -9.663*** 0.1609 
∆ Commodity EA -8.790*** 0.1277 
*Significant at ten percent level, ** Significant at five percent level, ***Significant at one 
percent level. KPSS test without trend. PP and KPSS: lags 12 
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